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Introduction
To be clear, I write and teach about U.S. constitutional law. I am not a 
comparative constitutional lawyer, nor do I aspire to be one at this point. In 
light of how I teach my students, however, I may be appropriately situated to 
contribute to a conversation on integrating transnational legal perspectives 
into the introductory course in constitutional law. Increasingly, even profes-
sors who remain focused on U.S. constitutional law incorporate transnational 
legal perspectives in their instruction.1
In this essay, I identify several uses of transnational perspectives in first-
year constitutional law: (1) comparing American constitutional arrange-
ments to those in other countries; (2) teaching international law and foreign 
legal experiences when relevant to U.S. litigation in the “war on terror”; 
and (3) examining the U.S. Supreme Court’s invocations of foreign legal 
practices. I illustrate these uses with examples from doctrinal areas that I 
1. Because the terminology can be unclear and even conceptually unstable, I want to clarify 
what kinds of law I mean by the term “transnational legal perspectives.” I understand trans-
national law to encompass the law of other nations, the law governing cross-border legal 
matters (which is sometimes incorporated into domestic legal norms), public international 
law, and anything else “legal” that might be relevant to transactions involving contacts be-
tween at least two nations. Transnational law is conceptually distinct from “non-U.S. law,” 
which is used as shorthand for everything “legal” that has not been incorporated into do-
mestic U.S. law. See the discussion of the Supreme Court’s invocations of foreign legal 
practices; see generally Mark Tushnet, How (and How Not) to Use Comparative Constitu-
tional Law in Basic Constitutional Law Courses, 49 St. Louis U. L. J. 671 (2005). Non-U.S. 
law includes most of what is called transnational law, but not all of it. 
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cover in my course.2 While each use serves a distinct pedagogical purpose, 
cumulatively they underscore the increasing importance of transnational le-
gal perspectives in U.S. constitutional law. I conclude, however, with a cau-
tionary note. Selectivity and modesty are warranted, I suggest, because the 
course appropriately focuses on the United States, teaching time is scarce, 
coverage tradeoffs abound, the subject matter is complex, and one cannot 
easily construct transnational examples that are both intellectually serious 
and pedagogically tractable.
Comparisons to Practices in Other Countries
Comparing constitutional practices in the United States with those else-
where gives students the sense that the American constitutional structure is 
neither inevitable nor necessarily best. Such comparisons can stimulate dis-
cussions about which approaches to constitutional questions are most desir-
able in particular institutional and cultural contexts, and can also encourage 
students to question why one approach was adopted in the United States but 
not another. In making such comparisons to other nations, students gain a 
sense of the great extent to which constitutional provisions are a product of 
the time, circumstances, and culture in which they are adopted. For example, 
other nations do not have anything like the Third Amendment, nor would the 
United States if the Constitution were written today or if the British had not 
engaged in the practice that the amendment proscribes.3
Separation of Powers
In the area of separation of powers, I draw from foreign legal experience 
in teaching Marbury v. Madison and judicial review. In my experience, many 
students come to law school believing that U.S.-style judicial supremacy is 
a logical entailment of a written constitution that imposes meaningful limits 
on the exercise of government power. Alexander Hamilton’s defense of judi-
cial review in Federalist 78 and Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury v. 
Madison solidify—and may be partly responsible for—this impression. I have 
2. Students at Duke Law School take the basic 4.5-credit course in Constitutional Law dur-
ing their first year. My course covers separation of powers, federalism, incorporation, state 
action, substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection. When time 
permits, I also teach the power of Congress to authorize private suits against states. 
3. The Third Amendment provides that “[n]o Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered 
in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to 
be prescribed by law.” U.S. Const. amend. III. I reference the Third Amendment at the 
beginning of my course as an example of the historical contingency of constitutional pro-
visions. The Amendment does not reappear until my students encounter Justice Douglas’ 
controversial opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guar-
antees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. 
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as 
we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 
‘in any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that 
privacy… .” (citation omitted)).
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found that I can motivate students to think critically about the functional 
advisability of judicial supremecy, as opposed to its self-evident inevitability 
or logical necessity, by stressing that few other democracies in the world have 
high courts with as much authority to resolve constitutional questions as the 
U.S. Supreme Court.4 
To be sure, use of transnational perspectives is not essential if one wants 
to encourage students to question U.S.-style judicial review. One could sim-
ply interrogate Alexander Hamilton’s and Chief Justice Marshall’s reason-
ing—and that of the students who endorse it reflexively. Both Hamilton and 
the great Chief Justice beg the question of who decides whether a particular 
government action comports with the Constitution when the legislature and 
the courts disagree on this question. Neither explains why his reasoning does 
not apply with equal force when the U.S. Supreme Court decides the scope of 
its own power—as in Marbury itself, when the Court declared that it possessed 
the awesome power of judicial review. 
But the transnational dimension constitutes a useful supplement to rigor-
ous analysis of foundational reasoning. Exposure to the practices of other na-
tions tends to free students up to think critically about American institutions.5 
The idea that “it couldn’t be otherwise” becomes more difficult to sustain if, in 
fact, it is otherwise elsewhere.6
One might question the need to look abroad if the purpose is to unsettle the 
normative power of the actual in the minds of students.7 One could also look 
back, using U.S. constitutional history as a source of comparisons. For much 
4. Canada, Germany, South Africa, and Hungary have high courts that exercise robust pow-
ers of judicial review in constitutional cases. Regarding the Hungarian experience, see 
Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Hungarian Constitutional Court, 8 E. Eur. Const. Rev. 
81 (Fall 1999) (discussing the Court’s practice of holding that parliament was acting “un-
constitutionally by omission” by failing to pass certain legislation); Donald L. Horowitz, 
Constitutional Courts: Issues for Iraq (2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thor) (describing various ways in which “[t]he Hungarian Constitutional Court has been 
unusually aggressive”).
5. Mark Tushnet offers a useful example: “[T]he Canadian ‘notwithstanding’ mechanism…
allows a legislature to override specific constitutional provisions by majority vote, in legisla-
tion that sunsets after five years, a period that necessarily encompasses an election in which 
the voters can decide whether they approve of the legislature’s action.” Tushnet, How (and 
How Not) to Use Comparative Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 675. 
6. See Horowitz, Constitutional Courts, supra note 4 (“Constitutional courts are important, 
but not always indispensable, features of constitutional government. Britain developed a 
constitutional regime without judicial review of legislation or governmental action for its 
constitutionality. Parliamentary supremacy did not produce an illiberal regime. Switzerland 
has had relatively little judicial review and still has no separate constitutional court. Yet there 
are few more vibrantly liberal democratic countries in the world.”). 
7. See Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of 
Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 71 (1965) (“There indeed exists what Felix Cohen char-
acterized as ‘the normative power of the actual’: that which is law tends by its very existence 
to generate a sense of being also that which ought to be the law.”).
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of the existence of the United States as a nation, for example, the Supreme 
Court was not nearly as powerful an institution as it is today. 
History plays an important role in a constitutional law course. But trans-
national perspectives and historical comparisons are not mutually exclusive 
alternatives. And the key point for my current purposes is that transnational 
outlooks can sometimes unsettle the preconceptions of students more effectively 
than U.S. history can. 
Certain aspects of American history are significantly more foreign to con-
temporary American students than are the practices of many modern coun-
tries—so much so that invoking American history might serve only to reinforce 
the normative power of current constitutional arrangements in this country. 
Students might wonder why they should care that early nineteenth-century 
Americans lived with a relatively weak Supreme Court when they also owned 
slaves and did not allow women to vote. Because modern Europeans are much 
more “like us,” their having different structures and extents of judicial review is 
more salient. In my experience, students intuitively tend to view the world and 
American history this way, so that the “it wasn’t always this way” point about 
the historical contingency of constitutional practices falls on relatively deaf 
ears, while the submission that “it isn’t this way everywhere” has more force.8 
Federalism
There is another reason why transnational outlooks can prove more effec-
tive than U.S. history in unsettling the preconceptions of students. Looking 
to American history can be of limited usefulness in reaching students who 
identify certain structural arrangements with particular ideological commit-
ments. For example, some students view the supposed “virtues” of federalism 
or “states’ rights” as necessarily a euphemism for the law and politics of racial 
apartheid. Switching venues to, say, the European Union, can depoliticize the 
issue, facilitating a functional, normative analysis of the various potential roles 
of states in a federal system.9
When my course turns to federalism, I compare the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
view of commandeering with that of the European Union and Germany. The 
general view of member states of the European Union on commandeering is the 
opposite of the U.S. Supreme Court’s position: member states tend to prefer 
8. Cf. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. J., U.S., Speech at the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind: The Value of a Comparative 
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Feb. 7, 2006) (transcript available at <http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-07b-06.html> (last visited Sept. 21, 
2006). (“The U.S. judicial system will be the poorer, I have urged, if we do not both share 
our experience with, and learn from, legal systems with values and a commitment to democracy similar to 
our own.” (emphasis added)).
9. The concern here is with student bias, not with an actual paucity of forceful examples in 
U.S. history that belie the identification of federalism with racism. See, e.g., Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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directives, which “command a Member State to regulate in a particular area and 
thus require further Member State legislative action to become fully effective 
within that state,” to regulations, which “have immediate legal force for indi-
viduals within a Member State.”10 Among other things,11 the general European 
judgment is that directives leave member states with more regulatory power.12 
In a relatively rare instance of comparative analysis on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Justice Breyer flagged this perceived virtue of commandeering on the other side 
of the Atlantic:
At least some other countries, facing the same basic problem, have found that 
local control is better maintained through application of a principle that is 
the direct opposite of the principle the majority derives from the silence of 
our Constitution. The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the Eu-
ropean Union, for example, all provide that constituent states, not federal bu-
reaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or 
decrees enacted by the central “federal” body… . They do so in part because 
they believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with the independent 
authority of the “state,” member nation, or other subsidiary government, and 
helps to safeguard individual liberty as well.13
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia declined Justice Breyer’s invitation to 
10. Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in The Fed-
eral Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European 
Union (Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse eds., New York, 2001) [hereinafter The Is-
sue of Commandeering] (“In the European Union, by contrast [to the United States], the 
subject of concern is not Union action that ‘commandeers’ Member State legislative or ad-
ministrative bodies, but EU legislative activity that has direct effect in the legal systems of 
the Member States. Member States tend not to welcome Community regulations, which 
have immediate legal force for individuals within a Member State, and instead prefer that 
the Community pass directives, which command a Member State to regulate in a particular 
area and thus require further Member State legislative action to become fully effective within 
that state. So, too, ‘commandeering’ is a basic feature of German federalism… .”) (footnote 
omitted). See also Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality 
of Federal Systems, 90 Va. L. Rev. 731, 800, 801 (2004) [hereinafter Of Power and Respon-
sibility] (arguing that the Tenth Amendment decisions “stand in striking contrast to the 
analogous doctrines of the European Court of Justice,” and exploring some of the “reasons 
for welcoming ‘commandeering’ in the European Union but not in the United States”). 
11. In addition to the issue of regulatory control discussed in the text, Halberstam stresses that 
“the United States Supreme Court treats the various levels of government as permanently 
hostile adversaries that have reached a bargain in a historically situated arms-length deal, 
whereas the European Court of Justice views the various actors as fundamentally joined in a 
common enterprise.” Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility, supra note 10, at 801.
12. Technically, both directives and regulations qualify as forms of “commandeering” under U.S. 
Supreme Court doctrine—specifically, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)—because 
most regulations in the European Union must be enforced by member-state institutions. 
See, e.g., Halberstam, The Issue of Commandeering, supra note 10, at 213. Note, moreover, 
that even if one were to dispute Professor Halberstam’s empirical judgment about the pref-
erences of member states, the key conceptual point would remain that both directives and 
regulations are clearly legal in the European Union.
13. Printz, 521 U.S. at 976-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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look abroad, deeming “such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of 
interpreting a constitution.”14
Dabbling in comparative law by contrasting legal regimes briefly and at 
a high level of abstraction does not position Justices, let alone students, to 
offer definitive conclusions about the wisdom of current Tenth Amendment 
doctrine. Justice Breyer rightly recognized that “we are interpreting our own 
Constitution, and not those of other nations, and there may be relevant politi-
cal and structural differences between their systems and our own.”15 Indeed, 
Daniel Halberstam’s analysis of the institutional dynamics in the United 
States and European Union helps to account for their opposite approaches 
to commandeering:
The US anti-commandeering rule exists in the context of a federal system 
marked by independently constituted, independently competent levels of 
governance that coexist…with a powerful federal government whose sphere 
of influence has proven difficult to contain by other means. Here, the anti-
commandeering rule may be viewed as a consensus-forcing device by separat-
ing independent tiers of governance and requiring federal and State decision 
makers to reach agreement before working together.16 
According to Halberstam, the legal and political culture in Europe is 
markedly different:
[T]he EU and Germany have both preserved…limitations on central govern-
ment expansion and mechanisms of component State control over central 
government norms. Constitutional provisions and practical realities in both 
the EU and Germany make the central governing structure in both systems 
dependent on the component States for administrative services. And in both 
systems, component States are represented in their corporate capacities in 
the central governing institutions. Thus, in the EU and in Germany, com-
mandeering is embedded within a system of consensus-forcing governance 
with structural limitations on the expansion of the central government…. 
[C]ommandeering may be viewed as a further mechanism to maintain the 
dependence of the central government on the component States and to pre-
serve a sphere for additional component State input while carrying out central 
commands.17
The political safeguards of federalism are more present in Europe than they 
are here. 
Moreover, the directive in European Union law (1) refers only to comman-
deered legislation, not to executive action, as was at issue in Printz; (2) is specifically 
provided for in the European Union Treaty; (3) is the only available instrument 
14. Id. at 921 n.11.
15. Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16. Halberstam, Comparative Federalism, supra note 10, at 249-50 (footnote omitted).
17. Id.
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in some areas; and (4) is partly justified by the very different doctrinal structures 
that characterize the legal regimes of member states. Directives enable them to 
realize given policy goals in a variety of legal systems, a concern less relevant 
in the United States because differences among state laws are more substantive 
and less doctrinal (perhaps excepting Louisiana).18 
Accordingly, there exists a stronger textual basis for legislative comman-
deering in the European Union than in the United States and a greater need 
for state-level flexibility. Such wrinkles, however, do not appear to detract 
from Justice Breyer’s suggestion that the European “experience may none-
theless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a 
common legal problem.”19 Halberstam’s examination of commandeering in 
Europe seems to corroborate Justice Breyer’s conclusion that commandeering 
tends to afford states greater regulatory control than does preemption.20
I ask my students whether they are persuaded by Justice Breyer’s analysis of 
relative regulatory control,21 and if so, whether his arguments sound not only 
in public policy but also in constitutional law. The Court’s anticommandeer-
ing decisions do not discuss the importance of state regulatory control to the 
values advanced by federalism. Instead, the Court has justified its categorical 
ban on commandeering by stressing the importance of clear vertical divisions 
of authority and political accountability.22 Regardless of whether one believes 
that the Court’s holdings in this area are correct, transnational perspectives 
from the European Union and Germany can inform a more comprehensive 
class discussion of the various constitutional values potentially at stake.
An Individual Rights Example: Substantive Due Process
Turning from constitutional structure to individual rights, I ask my students 
to consider the fact that many European countries restrict access to abortion to 
a much greater extent than the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed to date,23 yet 
18. See id. at 213-14, 230-31.
19. Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
20. See, e.g., Halberstam, Comparative Federalism, supra note 10, at 247 (noting that “the 
anti-commandeering rule might have perverse effects, by prodding the central govern-
ment to develop the bureaucracy necessary to implement its policy without involving the 
component States”).
21. For further discussion, see Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federal-
ism Perspective, 59 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006).
22. In New York v. United States, for example, Justice O’Connor wrote for the Court that “where 
the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and 
federal officials is diminished” because “it may be state officials who will bear the brunt 
of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program 
may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.” New York v. 
U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
23. In the recent juvenile death-penalty case, see infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text, Jus-
tice Scalia underscored the Court’s inattention to the international community’s greater 
tolerance of restrictions on abortion:
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these communities provide more explicit and robust protection of other privacy 
rights. Germans, for instance, enjoy protection of personal “dignity” (Article 1) 
and the “right to the free development of…personality” (Article 2), together with 
provisions protecting the “[p]rivacy of letters, posts, and telecommunications” 
(Article 10) and the “[i]nviolability of the home” (Article 13), in their Constitu-
tion.24 This is a more extensive right to privacy than Americans possess, particu-
larly because the right has been used to protect personal data and privacy from 
invasions by the press and market.25 
The point of the example is not to suggest any inconsistency within the 
European view. Rather, the purpose is to underscore a strong contrast with 
U.S. constitutional law. This contrast encourages U.S. students to consider 
whether cases like Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey necessarily follow from a broad conception of privacy rights, or whether 
the government’s interest in protecting a fetus suffices to distinguish the abor-
tion question from other privacy issues of constitutional moment. To facilitate 
this discussion, I inform my students that the West German Constitutional 
Court declared unconstitutional a statute protecting abortion rights around 
the same time as Roe.26 
In addition, the abortion comparison helps to clear the ideological air by 
illustrating that appeals to transnational legal perspectives can be used to ad-
vance both liberal and conservative constitutional commitments. To consider 
another example, Chief Justice Rehnquist invoked the Dutch experience 
with assisted suicide in Washington v. Glucksberg to support the Court’s rejection 
of a fundamental-rights claim in that case.27 And in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
 And let us not forget the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, which makes us one 
of only six countries that allow abortion on demand until the point of viabili-
ty. Though the Government and amici in cases following Roe v. Wade…urged 
the Court to follow the international community’s lead, these arguments fell 
on deaf ears. 
 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 625-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
24. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, available at <http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/
docs/german.htm> (last visited June 20, 2006). 
25. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 139, 186 (“The German 
courts have decided several cases addressing the balance between the right to ‘informational 
self-determination’ and ‘freedom of the press.’ The courts’ analysis, of course, depends upon 
a constitutional context quite different from ours: the privacy right is expressly protected by 
the German Constitution and applies to relationships among citizens, not simply between 
the citizen and the state.”). 
26. See Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany: Should Ameri-
cans Pay Attention?, 10 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 1, 6 (1994) (citing 39 Entscheidungen 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [First Senate] 1.42 (F.R.G.) (1975), translated in 9 
J. Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 551, 605-84 (1976)).
27. 521 U.S. 702, 734-35 (1997). Glucksberg illustrates the practice of looking overseas to consider 
the consequences of a particular rule in order to determine whether the rule is consonant with 
relevant constitutional values. Glucksberg also underscores the care with which such looking 
abroad should be conducted: the Glucksberg Court’s account of the Dutch experience has not 
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Department of Health, he underscored that not only “the States,” but “indeed, all 
civilized nations…demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as 
a serious crime.”28
Entrenchment Provisions
One more example of comparison that I include in my course warrants 
brief mention here: entrenchment provisions. The U.S. Constitution is deeply 
entrenched in its difficulty of amendment, as evidenced by the fact that only 
seventeen amendments (beyond the Bill of Rights) have been ratified in more 
than two hundred years. By contrast, some nations—and some states in the 
United States—have constitutions that are easier to amend.29 Moreover, Article 
V of the U.S. Constitution immunizes little from modification via amendment: 
only certain now-inoperable slavery provisions and the entitlement of states to 
equal representation in the Senate. But some other nations have more in their 
constitutions that cannot be changed.30 I invoke these facts towards the begin-
ning of my course so that students will consider why constitutional change 
is designed to be more difficult than legislative change, and what an optimal 
Article V provision might provide in light of its animating purposes.
International Law and Foreign Experiences in the “War on Terror”
Beyond serving as fodder for comparisons to legal practices in other coun-
tries, transnational perspectives also inform my teaching of judicial decisions 
in the “war on terror.” In covering cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld31 and Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,32 which implicate questions of statutory interpretation in addition to 
constitutional law,33 I expose my students to some of the international law of 
been replicated here. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 912-13 (2006).
28. 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (emphasis added).
29. Both the Indian Constitution and the (unwritten) constitution of the United Kingdom may 
be amended by a simple majority of the legislature. Robert L. Maddex, Constitutions of 
the World 159, 372 (2d ed., Wash., D.C., 2001). Additionally, several U.S. states—including 
Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, and Massachusetts—require only a simple majority vote 
in the legislature to amend their constitutions. Robert L. Maddex, State Constitutions of 
the United States xxxii - v (Wash., D.C., 2006).
30. In Brazil, for example, no amendment may abolish the federal form of government, the 
direct, secret, universal, periodic vote, the principle of separation of powers, or individual 
rights and guarantees. Maddex, Constitutions of the World, supra note 29, at 52. In Chad, 
amendments may not be proposed if they interfere with territorial integrity, independence, 
national unity, the republican form of government, the division of powers and security, 
the freedoms and fundamental rights of citizens, or political pluralism. Id. at 69. Germany 
prohibits amendments to the first twenty articles of its constitution and any change to the 
constitution that would affect the division of the federation into states or state participation 
in legislation. Id. at 132.
31. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
32. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2006 WL 1764793. 
33. Statutory interpretation and constitutional law are related because, among other reasons, the 
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war and the Geneva Conventions. Justice O’Connor’s controlling plurality 
opinion in Hamdi relies heavily upon a particular understanding of the law 
of war in concluding that Congress had authorized the president’s indefinite 
detention of a citizen who was an alleged enemy combatant:
There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States 
in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have support-
ed the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals 
Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF. We conclude that detention 
of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the du-
ration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental 
and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the “necessary and ap-
propriate force” Congress has authorized the President to use.34
Justice Souter’s opinion in Hamdi also makes extensive use of the law of war. 
He, however, comes to an opposite conclusion from the plurality on the ques-
tion of congressional authorization because he found that the government ap-
peared not “to be acting in accordance with customary law of war and hence 
to be within the terms of the [AUMF] in its detention of Hamdi”:
By holding him incommunicado… , the Government obviously has not been 
treating him as a prisoner of war, and in fact the Government claims that no 
Taliban detainee is entitled to prisoner of war status. This treatment appears 
to be a violation of the Geneva Convention provision that even in cases of 
doubt, captives are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war “until such time 
as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.” The Govern-
ment answers that the President’s determination that Taliban detainees do not 
qualify as prisoners of war is conclusive as to Hamdi’s status and removes any 
doubt that would trigger application of the Convention’s tribunal require-
ment. But reliance on this categorical pronouncement to settle doubt is appar-
ently at odds with the military regulation adopted to implement the Geneva 
Convention, and setting out a detailed procedure for a military tribunal to 
determine an individual’s status.…35 
outcome of an exercise in statutory construction can determine whether the court must de-
cide a constitutional issue. In Hamdi, for example, the plurality avoided the question whether 
the president possessed inherent Article II power to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combat-
ants by holding that Congress had authorized the President’s actions. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 
516-17. 
34. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (referencing the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), which authorizes the president to use “all necessary 
and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or persons” associated with the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001). Justice O’Connor also wrote, among other things, that 
“[t]here remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by an 
appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.” Id. at 538 (citing Enemy 
Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, Army Regu-
lation 190-8, §§ 1–6 (1997)). Army Regulation 190-8 was adopted to implement the Geneva 
Convention. It specifies the procedures that administrative military tribunals must follow in 
determining a detainee’s prisoner-of-war (POW) status. See id.
35. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 549-51 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring 
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In Hamdan, moreover, the Court embraced the position that the Government 
was not complying with the law of war upon which it was allegedly relying in 
seeking to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba by military commission.36 
One cannot successfully teach these cases without exposing students to the rel-
evant federal statutes, Geneva Convention provisions, and military regulations 
implementing them. 
Such knowledge is also useful in introducing students to other controver-
sial actions that the Executive Branch has defended, at least in part, by in-
voking the same federal statute at issue in Hamdi and Hamdan—namely, the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”). Of particular relevance is 
the National Security Agency’s program of warrantless domestic spying. The 
international law of war does not decisively resolve such legal questions, which 
turn primarily on issues of statutory construction. But the law of war provides 
a frame of reference that informs legal arguments about what Congress reason-
ably can be understood to have intended when it drafted a law authorizing the 
president to use military force.37 
Not only is international law important in U.S. constitutional litigation, but 
the experiences of other nations in dealing with terrorism are also relevant in 
evaluating the strength of the interests asserted by the government in court. 
The United States is less experienced at confronting issues involving the de-
tention and interrogation of terror suspects than is, for example, the United 
Kingdom and Israel.38 The United States is thus more appropriately situated 
in judgment) (referencing Army Regulation 190-8, §§ 1-5, 1-6).  
36. A federal district court adopted Justice Souter’s reasoning in Hamdi and applied it to detain-
ees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(Robertson, J.). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, 
holding among other things that Congress had authorized the military commissions at 
Guantanamo Bay, the Geneva Conventions gave detainees no right to enforce the treaty’s 
provisions in court, and the Guantanamo military commissions satisfied the “competent 
tribunal” requirement of Army Regulation 109-8. 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Supreme 
Court recently reversed on the ground that the military commissions violated Articles 21 and 
36(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 821 and 836(b), as well as Com-
mon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The Court held that Common Article 3 applies 
to the conflict with al Qaeda and controlled the litigation because Article 21 conditions the 
President’s authority to use military commissions on his compliance with the law of war, and 
the Conventions are incontrovertibly part of the law of war.
37. In discussing international law, I flag for students a potentially significant difference between 
its role—especially treaties—and the relevance of transnational materials generally. Interna-
tional law may impose direct, rather than merely interpretive, restraints on the Executive. 
See U.S. Const. art. VI (including treaties as part of “the supreme Law of the Land”). I also 
note to students that international law normally does not have constitutional status—for 
example, Congress can override treaties—but can acquire this status if it is incorporated in 
constitutional interpretation.
38. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Comparative Law Scholars and Experts on the Laws of the 
United Kingdom and Israel in Support of Respondent, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, No. 03-1027 (filed 
Apr. 12, 2004), at 3 (stressing “how dramatically the indefinite, incommunicado detention to 
which Petitioner has subjected Jose Padilla departs from the minimum procedural protections 
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to learn the lessons of their history, rather than the other way around. And 
with some such exposure to the trials, tribulations, and resulting policies of 
other nations, law students are better able to evaluate the Executive Branch’s 
current claims of national security and military necessity.39
The Supreme Court’s Invocations of Foreign Legal Practices
Finally, the debate among the Justices themselves regarding the citation 
of foreign legal sources, both in their opinions and beyond,40 has made it 
important to consider the relevance of transnational legal perspectives in 
teaching foundational issues of constitutional authority and interpretation. 
Among other questions, I address the following points with my students 
when covering various approaches to reading the Constitution.41
It is not clear what independent work, if any, the majority’s invocations 
of foreign legal authority are doing in the majority opinions in Atkins v. Vir-
ginia,42 Lawrence v. Texas,43 and Roper v. Simmons.44 In Roper, for example, Justice 
Kennedy explained for the Court that “[i]t is proper that we acknowledge 
that other democracies provide detained suspected terrorists”); H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. 
Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (prohibiting 
aggressive methods of interrogating terror suspects because they had not been legislatively 
authorized).
39. The experiential resources discussed in the text constitute more than policy considerations; 
they inform the doctrinal tests articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in constitutional cases. 
See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (“Mathews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)] dictates that 
the process due in any given instance is determined by weighing ‘the private interest that 
will be affected by the official action’ against the Government’s asserted interest, ‘including 
the function involved’ and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater 
process. 424 U.S. at 335. The Mathews calculus then contemplates a judicious balancing of 
these concerns, through an analysis of ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation’ of the private in-
terest if the process were reduced and the ‘probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
safeguards.’” Id.). 
40. On January 13, 2005, Justices Scalia and Breyer met at American University’s Washington 
College of Law in Washington, D.C. to discuss whether the U.S. Supreme Court should cite 
foreign judicial decisions in its opinions. Their conversation has since been published. See 
Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A 
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 Int’l J. Const. 
L. 519 (2005). 
41. Because I do not cover the death penalty in my course, I expose my students to this mate-
rial towards the beginning of the semester, when I teach different theories of constitutional 
interpretation. 
42. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of mentally retarded persons is prohibited 
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
43. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas law making it a crime for two persons of the same 
sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).
44. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the execution of persons who were under eighteen years 
of age at the time they committed their capital crimes is prohibited by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments).
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the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death 
penalty,” and that “[t]he opinion of the world community, while not control-
ling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for 
our own conclusions.”45 He added that “[i]t does not lessen our fidelity to the 
Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affir-
mation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply un-
derscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of free-
dom.”46 It is unclear whether Justice Kennedy is implying that the opinion of 
the world community could also disconfirm a constitutional conclusion that 
the Court would otherwise accept. It is also not clear why the Court seems to 
invoke foreign legal authority selectively—that is, regarding only certain legal 
questions and from only certain countries. One might further query why the 
same transnational comparisons do not “simply underscore[]” how We the 
People are different from the rest of the world—that is, how America’s “pres-
ent-day self-definition and national identity”47 compel distinct resolutions of 
similar legal problems.
At the same time, those who criticize the Court’s citations to foreign legal 
authority in Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper may not have persuasively explained 
why their objections do not apply with similar force when the Justices cite law 
review articles, the Bible, or even lower court decisions. All are employed as 
forms of persuasive authority, nothing more.48 It may be a stretch to distin-
guish foreign judicial decisions from other sources by suggesting that reliance 
on decisions from non-American courts will facilitate “judicial activism” and 
“making it up” in ways that the other sources cannot.49 
Accordingly, I ask students whether the objections sound primarily in 
methodological concerns or in substantive disagreement with the Court’s 
conclusions in these cases. To those who agree with the Court’s critics, I 
45. Id. at 578.
46. Id. at 578.
47. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
48. See Ginsburg, A Decent Respect, supra note 8: 
Judges in the United States are free to consult all manner of commentary—Restate-
ments, Treatises, what law professors and even law students write copiously in law 
reviews, for example. If we can consult those writings, why not the analysis of a ques-
tion similar to the one we confront contained in an opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the German Constitutional Court, 
or the European Court of Human Rights?… Foreign opinions are not authoritative; 
they set no binding precedent for the U.S. judge. But they can add to the store of 
knowledge relevant to the solution of trying questions. 
49. Compare, e.g., the Scalia/Breyer Discussion, supra note 40, at 530-31 (Scalia: “It invites ma-
nipulation. You know, I want to do this thing; I have to think of some reason for it. I have 
to write something that—you know, that sounds like a lawyer. I have to cite something.”) 
with id. (Breyer: “But if you are not conscientious, why become a judge? What would be 
the pleasure or reward in entering a profession that prizes integrity, honesty, doing the job 
properly?”). 
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inquire why Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinions in Glucksberg and Cruzan 
never caused a legal and political controversy about the Court’s reliance 
on foreign legal perspectives and experiences. I also ask whether a similar 
tumult would have ensued if the Court had looked across the Atlantic in 
using Casey to overrule Roe. There is rich material here for class discus-
sions about the legitimacy of the Court’s uses of non-U.S. law in deciding 
controversial constitutional cases.
Putting aside the politics of constitutional law and questions of consistency, 
this debate within and beyond the Court focuses the attention of students on 
theories of constitutional interpretation. I challenge my students to consider 
which accounts of the legitimate exercise of judicial review render foreign ju-
dicial decisions relevant to U.S. constitutional law. Specifically, I suggest that 
the controversy over citing foreign legal authority raises profound questions 
for the view that the meaning of the Constitution changes over time.50 To what 
extent does the authority of the Constitution as ethos—as an evolving instanti-
ation of collective identity51—encompass not just a consensus on contemporary 
American values, but on values of the world as well? Why should or should 
not “[t]he opinion of the world community” provide a criterion for consti-
tutional judgment? Whatever one’s answer to these questions, transnational 
legal perspectives facilitate their formulation. By asking such questions to my 
students, I focus their attention on the nature and legitimate scope of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review in constitutional cases. 
Conclusion: A Cautionary Note
For the reasons explored above, I believe it is important to expose students 
in my introductory course in U.S. constitutional law to transnational legal per-
spectives. Indeed, I respectfully appeal to casebook authors to include more 
transnational material so that instructors are better able to teach it. I also think 
it is important, however, not to overstate the case for transnational perspec-
tives in teaching a first-year course in constitutional law. Although I support 
the general enterprise, I avoid comprehensive transnational comparisons in 
class, just as I have resisted claims of pedagogical necessity in this essay. In my 
judgment, a first-year course in U.S. constitutional law appropriately focuses 
on the U.S. Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review in constitutional cases, 
as well as on the constitutionally relevant conduct of other federal and state 
50. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“that our understanding of the 
Constitution does change from time to time has been settled since John Marshall breathed 
life into its text”). Questions about the proper use of transnational perspectives are ana-
lytically separable from debates about the meaning of the U.S. Constitution as fixed absent 
amendment or evolving regardless of amendment. But for proponents of an evolving 
Constitution, the issue arises whether (and why) this evolution should be responsive to 
transnational legal perspectives.
51. See generally, Robert C. Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in Robert Post, 
Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management 23-50 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1995).
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officials. The transnational dimension, in other words, constitutes a relatively 
minor part of my overall course. 
Of course, times change and so does the content of U.S. constitutional law. 
Transnational perspectives arguably matter more today than in times past. 
Globalization continues to make the world a smaller place, the U.S. Supreme 
Court confronts the legal limits of presidential power in the “war on terror,” 
and the Justices themselves are invoking (or criticizing invocations of) foreign 
legal authority. 
But in a survey course in U.S. constitutional law, class time remains a scarce 
resource and coverage tradeoffs must be negotiated with discipline. Moreover, 
U.S. constitutional law is a difficult subject for beginning law students to mas-
ter when studied on its own terms. Routinely adding other legal systems to 
the course discussion can cultivate confusion, not clarity. Finally, and most 
importantly, teachers who are not comparative constitutional lawyers must 
confront the daunting reality that it is difficult to construct transnational ex-
amples that are both intellectually serious and pedagogically tractable.52 One 
must proceed with care, lest a little knowledge become a dangerous thing and 
one’s students conclude that they are competent to make useful comparisons 
without serious study of other legal systems and comparative constitutional 
law.53 I therefore suggest that transnational legal perspectives are best cast in a 
modest, supporting role in introductory courses in constitutional law. 
52. See Tushnet, How (and How Not) to Use Comparitive Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 
671 (“[T]he task of incorporating non-national material in a nationally oriented course is not 
an easy one. Facile comparisons are easy; serious ones difficult. Differences in culture, in 
legal traditions, and in institutional arrangements other than the one being compared at the 
moment all require great caution in suggesting to U.S. law students that they can become 
better lawyers by knowing a little bit about non-U.S. law.”). Yet comparativists might take 
care not to scare off U.S.-centered teachers by setting impossibly high standards regarding 
what counts as a responsible transnational comparison. There is a middle ground, one that 
requires some (but not extensive) transnational expertise on the part of the instructor and 
that results in illuminating pedagogical comparisons.
53. I am also concerned that teaching a little transnational law in U.S.-centered courses might 
sap the desire of law faculties to hire comparative lawyers who specialize in teaching com-
parative law. Such an outcome would be unfortunate, an inexpensive but insufficiently 
considered way out of the implications of globalization for legal education. The solution is 
not to minimize student exposure to transnational perspectives in first-year courses, but to 
continue hiring comparative legal scholars. 
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